REMEMBER THE DRUG WAR?

A Casualty of Terrorism You Haven't Heard Much About

When the Bush administration tires of patting itself on the back for
the successful war in Afghanistan it might consider the war it is
losing -- the one on drugs.

Following the terrorism of Sept. 11, Washington's attention -- and
much of our military and other assets -- were shifted to address the
threat posed by terrorism.

More than half the Coast Guard's anti-drug efforts were redirected to
guard harbors and oil refineries. While this improved our defenses
against new acts of terrorism, it lowered them when it comes to drugs.

Cocaine seizures by the Coast Guard are down 66 percent from a year
ago. The war on terrorism is like the war on drugs in at least two
ways. In neither struggle will there ever be a final victory.

Yet in both cases, the damage that would result from failing to
combat the problem would be far worse than the cost of waging a
struggle without end. Whatever qualms people have about the drug war,
we must strive for effective, not random, enforcement. And unless we
decide to legalize drugs, we cannot abandon that enforcement effort.

Clearly efforts against terrorism must be given top priority for the
time being. There is, however, at least one measure againstillegal
drug trafficking that can be taken immediately, that has worked in
the past and that does not require many resources: the resumption of
our support of drug interdiction flights in Peru and Colombia.

These flights were suspended last April after a Peruvian Air Force
fighter jet shot down a civilian floatplane with five Americans
onboard. The incident resulted in the wounding of the pilot, and the
death of a missionary and her infant daughter.

A CIA aircraft had tracked the missionary plane, thought it might be
a drug flight, and guided the Peruvian fighter to it. Procedure
should have been followed to identify the aircraft, determine its
purpose and, if it appeared to be carrying narcotics, to force it to
land.

The incident exposed a hidden part of the U.S. war on drugs.

In the past when warnings were ignored, planes were fired upon. In
the past seven years, 38 trafficking aircraft were shot or forced
down (many of those while I was serving as U.S. ambassador to Peru)
and a dozen more seized on the ground.

The CIA aircraft were necessary to help the fighter intercept the
suspect planes.

The State Department conducted an assessment of the tragedy and
issued its report last August. It revealed that the CIA aircraft was
late and ineffective in alerting the Peruvian fighter that this could
be an innocent flight.

It also noted that the Peruvian commander, who was ultimately
responsible, had rushed and fired on a plane that did not fit the
usual profile of a drug flight.

Should such mistakes, however tragic, be allowed to end efforts to
interdict drug flights?

When noncombatants are killed in Afghanistan, no one suggests halting
the war until our military operations can be made foolproof. When
police confrontations with young black men result in unarmed, and at
times completely innocent, individuals being killed, there are
protests and sometimes charges brought.

But no one recommends yanking all cops off their beats until the
verdict is in. The Bush administration has been dallying over whether
to resume the drug interdiction flights.

Asked more than two months ago whether the flights would be
restarted, a State Department spokesman said the findings of the
August report were still being reviewed.

While obviously distracted by events on other war front, the
administration also seems paralyzed by fear of new congressional
criticism.

Our elected representatives can indignantly castigate ever-unpopular
State Department and CIA bureaucrats, and know they have not lost a
vote. And for most Americans, the threat posed by drugs is no more
urgent than the threat of terrorism before Sept. 11.

The administration's procrastination may also stem from the fact that
most of the drugs from Peru are going to Brazil and Europe. But even
if the drugs go elsewhere, that does not mean they should cease to be
an American concern.

Cocaine consumption in Brazil has reached such proportions that the
country has become the world's second-largest market for the drug.
Local attempts to deal with the situation have not been particularly
vigorous or effective.

And what about the stability of Peru and the struggle against the
narco-terrorists in Colombia? In a recent interview, the drug czar
for Peru, Ricardo Vega Llona, said Peru was no longer winning its war
on drugs. This would be a setback for U.S. policy.

When I was ambassador to Peru from 1996 to 1999, about half of the
500 people atour embassy devoted all or most of their time to helping
Peru combat drug trafficking. I flew many times over the Andes to
coca-growing areas to look at the situationthere.

To understand the consequences of Peru losing its struggle, one only
has to look as far as Colombia. There the government withdrew its
forces from a chunk of territory the size of Switzerland and handed
the area over to narco-terrorists. Through this and other gestures,
the Colombian government hoped it could negotiate with the
narco-terrorists and persuade them to give up the hundreds of
millions of dollars they make each year from drugs, extortion and
kidnapping. In return the government offered the guerrillas the
opportunity to vote and run in an election they would lose. Given the
weakness of his military, his police and his society, Colombian
President Andres Pastrana had little choice but to hope such a
hopeless strategy would work. It didn't. Last week Pastrana gave the
drug-trafficking guerrillas 48 hours to get out of the area. It's not
clear what he can do if they don't.

A policy of no stick and small carrots will not deter the drug
traffickers. From my experience in Peru, it was clear that incentives
for growing legal crops were important, but that strong enforcement
measures were also required.

Peru's disgraced former president, Alberto Fujimori, who has found
asylum in Japan, understood this. While he did much to undermine
Peru's democracy, he also kept the drug lords and the terrorists from
connecting and taking over large parts of his country.

A key element of his strategy was the interdiction of flights.

As a result, the area under coca cultivation in Peru fell from 115,00
hectares in 1995 to 34,000 in 2000. Since the suspension of the
interdiction flights, however, prices paid by drug lords to coca
farmers and production has undoubtedly risen in response. It would be
ironic if Peru won its struggle to return to democracy only to lose
the struggle against drugs.

The loss of innocent lives is always a tragedy, whether it is a
missionary in Peru or a family in Afghanistan. But where there is a
need for military action or aggressive law enforcement, there are
guns and there will be victims of friendly fire. That may be
unfortunate, but it does not mean the war is not worth fighting.

Dennis Jett, former U.S. ambassador to Peru and Mozambique, is dean
of the International Center at the University of Florida.