AFGHANISTAN AND OPIUM

A recent UN report on drugs in Afghanistan points to the success of
eradication in decreasing the area under poppy cultivation by 21
percent during the past year. Yet this positive development is
fragile and likely unsustainable. Instead of doctrinally clinging to
eradication, the international community should explore other means
of decreasing Afghanistan's illicit economy, such as converting the
still vast opium cultivation into legal production for medical opiates.

The idea of transforming the cultivation for the production of codeine
and morphine is promoted by the Senlis Council, a European drug policy
think tank. Pointing to the successful implementation of such a scheme
in Turkey, where it eliminated the large illegal cultivation of
opium, the Senlis advocates ask: Why not Afghanistan?

Licensing production of legitimate drugs would not only shrink the
size of Afghanistan's illegal economy, it would also provide a
sustainable livelihood for the poor peasants, and generate income for
the Afghan state. Eradication of opium production has been the method
of choice for fighting the illegal drug trade thus far, but it is
socially explosive since the poor farmers do not have an alternative
source of livelihood. Even in the best case of eradication working,
this would mean the elimination of 40 percent of Afghanistan's gross
domestic product.

Licensing is not a perfect solution either.

It would be difficult to keep licensed farmers from selling their
opium to drug dealers for higher prices.

The International Narcotics Control Board that regulates exports of
medical opiates, and the narcotics treaties that permit the legal
cultivation of opium poppy for domestic medical opiates, require
government monopoly of the system in order to keep the opium from
falling into the wrong hands.

Given the poor security conditions in Afghanistan, the Afghan
government would have a hard time enforcing the regulations on farmers.

But these challenges should not keep a pilot program from being
attempted. For instance, private contractors could be hired not to
spray illicit crops, but to monitor and patrol the areas of legal
production. Compliance could also be reinforced by working with
traditional Afghan tribal structures. Realistically, some diversion
into the illegal market must be expected.

However, diversion smaller than the current 100 percent ''diversion"
into the illegal market is a step in the right direction.

Another challenge is what to do with farmers who are not issued a
license. Eradicating opium crops of unlicensed farmers would help
deter licensed farmers from diverting their opium into illegal
traffic, but it would also generate tensions among groups and tribes
that benefit more than others from the licensing scheme.

To maintain stability and still reduce illicit cultivation, it would
be better to focus on apprehending traffickers and busting the labs,
while working toward enhancing state law enforcement capacity and
enlarging licensed areas.

How much of the illicit economy could ultimately be absorbed for
medicinal uses would also depend on the demand for medical opiates.

One of the reasons why the licensing scheme has been successful in
Turkey is that the United States guarantees a market for Turkish (as
well as Indian) medical opiates.

Under the so-called ''80-20" rule -- up for review in January -- the
United States agrees to buy at least 80 percent of medical opiates
from Turkey and India. Together with Australia, Turkey and India are
the world's largest suppliers of legal opiates.

Turkey and India would, of course, object to the ''80-20 rule" being
altered to accommodate Afghanistan. In addition, if they lost their
market share, the odds for more of their crops ending up on the
illegal market increase. The INCB contends that there should be a
balance between demand and supply and that currently there is no space
for Afghanistan's medical opiates.

The Senlis Council contends that there is a need in developing
countries, where millions suffer from HIV/AIDS and cancers without any
pain-relief medications. Yet under the highly regulated market of
medical opiates, bureaucratic barriers to distributing these drugs
keep any such arrangement from happening quickly. Between need and
demand, there is regulation. However, a creative design of the US
foreign aid bill could combine money ear-marked for counternarcotics
efforts and for efforts to fight AIDS to purchase Afghanistan's legal
opium for distribution among AIDS patients in the developing world.

Granted there are potential problems, but a licensing system in
Afghanistan should be explored.

It would provide hope for alleviating poverty in Afghanistan and
suffering of others, as well as promise lucrative rewards for
pharmaceutical firms.