Source: U.S. News & World Report

The troubled reign of the nation's drug czar
The elusive quest for real power and respect

BY GORDON WITKIN

The press release said the trip would allow drug czar Barry McCaffrey
"to examine firsthand how the federal government can respond to the
drug threat" along the United StatesMexico border. Overseeing the
border effort would seem a logical role for a "czar" who coordinates
national policy, and so last week the retired general traveled from El
Paso to Laredo, to Tucson and Nogales, and on to San Diego.

But in the halls of the Justice Department, the view was more cynical.
Officials there said they considered the drug czar's efforts
pointlessly duplicative of the Justice Department's own border
enforcement efforts, which are coordinated by the U.S. attorney in San
Diego. Some derisively referred to the trip as the "Barry McCaffrey
Victory Tour."

Such is the respect that the drug czar's office receives inside the
federal bureaucracy. Virtually since its creation in 1988, the czar's
Office of National Drug Control Policy, as it's officially called, has
been viewed by others involved in the drug fight as a political symbol
rather than a substantive tool. And with reason: To fulfill a 1992
campaign pledge to cut the size of the White House staff, Bill Clinton
slashed the czar's office from 146 people to 25. Then to bolster his
drugfighting credentials heading into the 1996 campaign, he hired
McCaffrey, a decorated veteran of three wars, and vowed to bring the
staff back up to 150.

In coming weeks, Congress will consider the fate of the drug czar's
office, which could expire if not reauthorized by October 1. While it
has worked politically, has the drug czar actually helped address the
nation's drug problems?

Sneak attacks. The position of drug czar was created because of
concern that 50odd federal agencies were often working at
crosspurposes in the drug war. But the idea of a central overseer was
pushed by congressional Democrats on the reluctant Republican White
House of Ronald Reagan. "That meant the office was the product of a
compromise that emasculated its authority," says Raphael Perl of the
Congressional Research Service. Often the law enforcement agencies and
the drug czar seem to spend as much time fighting among themselves as
against the drug lords. Supporters of the czar sneaked into the 1994
crime bill a provision giving the office control over the budgets of
other drugrelated agencies. FBI director Louis Freeh quickly fired
off a memo to Attorney General Janet Reno protesting these "11thhour
amendments" in the "strongest of terms." His allies counterattacked by
amending other spending bills to cancel the drug czar's new powers. In
1995, Freeh and Drug Enforcement Administration chief Tom Constantine
argued to President Clinton that they should take over because the
drug war was "lacking . . . leadership."

Drug czars have had slightly more success in the role of national
spokesman. The first director was William Bennett, a forceful
conservative who generated a lot of press coverage and persuaded
George Bush to devote more energy to the drug issue. The attention may
have been a factor in helping reduce drug usage. But neither of the
next two directors, defeated Florida Gov. Bob Martinez and former New
York Police Commissioner Lee Brown, had Bennett's influence.

McCaffrey, 54, is the first czar since Bennett who has been able to
redirect national attention to the drug issue. His border trip last
week produced hefty press coverage, though part of the reason was a
death threat. As a former military man who ran drug interdiction
efforts in South America, McCaffrey has surprised people by arguing
that "drug prevention is the heart and soul of the drug strategy."
Sen. Joseph Biden says McCaffrey has taken the office "from a D to a
B."

But in recent months, his effectiveness has diminished. In January, he
praised Mexican Gen. J_Guti_Rebollo, who was later charged with
working for Mexico's top drug kingpin. And critics say McCaffrey
demagogically opposed initiatives in California and Arizona allowing
use of marijuana as medicineand then flipflopped, offering to study
the issue, after doctors attacked him.

Organizationally, sources say, McCaffrey is presiding over a tense,
chaotic office in which it's often unclear who is running what.
McCaffrey says his staff "is the singlebiggest collection of experts
on drug[s] . . . on the face of the earth." But numerous sources say
McCaffrey's inner circle consists mostly of energetic military
detailees and recently retired officers lacking expertise in drug
education, prevention, treatment, or enforcement. "There isn't a
person [in the czar's office] . . . who truly understands" the needs
of street cops, says Tim Nelson, chairman of the National Narcotic
Officers' Associations Coalition. Though McCaffrey has been the czar
for 17 months, several of the office's top jobs remain unfilled.

McCaffrey has, however, maintained influence at the White House. His
opinion that U.S. officials had little choice but to cooperate with
Mexico ultimately prevailed over Justice Department objections when
the president was deciding last March to "recertify" Mexico as an ally
in the drug war. McCaffrey has also gotten Congress to agree to a
massive new media campaign aimed at youth.

The larger question is whether Congress will learn from the drug
czar's past. The reauthorization bill floated so far by the
administration and congressional Democrats represents a finetuning of
the office and its powers. But House Speaker Newt Gingrich has said he
wants "a genuine czar" with more operational authority over agencies
like the FBI and DEA. Other drug policy experts argue that the czar
idea is inherently flawed. They recommend getting rid of the drug czar
and giving authority over drugs to the vice president, or going back
to a previous framework in which the attorney general chaired a drug
policy board. But any proposal that cuts, let alone eliminates, the
czar's position will be politically doomed. So McCaffrey and future
czars are likely to survive in a gray zone, where they can send
political signals but only sporadically have real effect.

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